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DISTINCTIVELY CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 
ON LEGALTHOUGHT? 
Mark Tushnet* 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT. Edited by Michael 
W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., and Angela C. Carmella. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. xxii, 518. Cloth, $50; paper, 
$26.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The plural in the title of Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought 
immediately suggests one problem in reviewing this collection of 
essays: identifying unifying themes is difficult precisely because there 
are a variety of Christian perspectives represented here.1 Christian 
perspectives include those of Anabaptists and their modern successors 
such as Mennonites (who regard law as simply irrelevant to their 
Christianity2), those of the nineteenth-century Catholic church (which 
was hostile to democracy and religious toleration), and those of the 
modern Catholic church (which endorses religious pluralism and the 
preferential option for the poor - among many others).3 What, then, 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. J.D. 1971, M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. - Ed. 
· 
1. Indeed, the editors devote Part Two of the book to "Christian Traditions and the 
Law," drawing on H. Richard Niebuhr's distinctions among synthesists who seek to reconcile 
Christ and the (existing) law, conversionists who seek to transform the law through Christ, 
separatists who believe that Christ necessarily stands against the positive law of any state, 
and dualists who see Christ and the law in creative tension. Leslie Griffin quotes Niebuhr to 
this effect: "[I]t must be evident that neither extension nor refinement of study could bring 
us to the conclusive result that would enable us to say, 'This is the Christian answer.' " P. 
199; see also p. 178 (essay by Teresa Stanton Collett) ("In considering the relation between 
orthodox Christianity and feminism, one is struck by the diversity of thought and emphasis 
within each of these 'communities of faith.' " (emphasis added)). 
2. Editor Robert F. Cochran, Jr., pithily summarizes the position of the late Mennonite 
theologian John Howard Yoder: "[I]t is not the business of Christians to work out the ethical 
problems of Satan." P. 246. 
3. The editors acknowledge this problem by, for example, pairing essays offering dif­
fering Christian perspectives on law-and-economics. Stephen M. Bainbridge offers an "apo­
logia" to the effect that law-and-economics refrains from paying much attention to questions 
of distributive justice on the ground that achieving economic justice through deliberate legal 
intervention raises difficult technical and prudential questions and is less likely to achieve 
such justice than the operation of market mechanisms that maximize wealth, pp. 208-23, 
while George E. Garvey draws on Catholic social thought to.argue that "maximizing the ag­
gregate wealth of society is not a morally acceptable goal if it results in a grossly inequitable 
1858 
May 2003] Distinctively Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought? 1859 
might be distinctive about Christian 'perspectives, given their diver­
sity?4 We can approach this question in stages.5 First, what - if any­
thing - distinguishes religious perspectives on legal thought from 
secular ones? Second, within the class of religious perspectives, what 
distinguishes Christian perspectives from other religious perspectives? 
I consider here some of the answers suggested by some of the 
essays in this collection.6 First, several authors treat the perspective 
they derive from Christian belief as producing results that non­
Christians and even nonbelievers should accept. Second, other authors 
treat their perspective on legal thought as Christian because they are 
Christians and feel (in a psychological sense, I think) that their per­
spectives arise organically from their Christian belief, but they do not 
explain the nature of that connection or why an outsider should think 
that there is any nonpsychological connection. Third, a handful of the 
authors do something - argue isn't precisely the right word, but per­
haps show is - to make the connection between their Christian belief 
and their perspective on law apparent.7 
My discussion is framed by something that puzzled me when I read 
the Introduction, a puzzlement that persisted pretty much throughout 
my reading the book.8 The editors write, "The key question of this 
distribution of that wealth," p. 239, and that economic growth is good "if it is achieved in 
ways that respect human dignity and when the benefits are distributed in ways that are just." 
P. 240; cf RAYMOND PLANT, POLITICS, THEOLOGY AND HISTORY 118 (2001) ("From a uni­
versalising systematic theology we might be able to ground a general Christian concern for 
social justice, but such a general grounding may completely underdetermine Christian politi­
cal praxis."). 
4. The diversity within the Christian tradition suggests that some of Stephen L. Carter's 
formulations are, at best, incautious. See, e.g. ,  p. 30 (referring to the "distorted Christianity 
of the Middle Ages" as "barely recognizable as Christian"); p. 34 (asserting that "some 
Western religions have caved in to the pressure to organize according to the meanings pro­
pounded by the state," following an acknowledgment that religious traditions change their 
understandings of their own content (emphasis added)). 
5. A similar question arises in connection with Paul Beaumont, Christian Perspectives on 
the Law: What Makes them Distinctive?, in LAW AND RELIGION 529 (Richard O'Dair & 
Andrew Lewis eds., 2001). Despite its title, Beaumont's essay discusses the way in which 
Christians might distin<;tively argue for positions that non-Christians adopt for other reasons. 
6. I do not discuss those essays that are primarily expositions of the views of Christian 
thinkers (other than the essays' authors) about law, primarily because I am in no position to 
say anything interesting about the views of, for example, the Dutch Calvinist Herman 
Dooyeweerd, as presented by David S. Caudill. Pp. 119-26. Nor do I discuss the extraordi­
nary meditation by Thomas L. Shaffer on forgiveness, pp. 321-39, which invites a conversa­
tional dialogue rather than the desiccated written response or reaction of a book review. 
7. In distinguishing between arguing and showing, I have in mind something like Witt­
genstein's point that some words cannot be defined but their meaning can be shown. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 'll 70-75 (G. E. M. Anscombe 
trans., 2d ed. rept. 1998) (1958). 
8. One source of the puzzlement may be that the collection's essays are, so to speak, 
theologically thin. The essays written from within the Roman Catholic tradition advert to 
and rely on the Church's teachings as expressed in papal encyclicals and other church docu­
ments, but do little in the way of explaining the place such writings have in Roman Catholic 
theology. And, there is almost no reference to or reliance on the important development of 
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book may be, 'What does it mean in America today to say that Jesus, 
rather than Caesar, is Lord?' " (p. xx). It seems to me that that ques­
tion, suitably adapted, will be a key one to an adherent of any religion 
that either makes no claims against whoever happens to hold secular 
power - a large class, I think - or to adherents of religions that as­
sert their right to rule in a perfect world but acknowledge that they 
live in an imperfect one, governed by Caesar. 9 That is, the question 
that the editors think is the key one does not seem to me to raise ques­
tions that are distinctively Christian. I would have thought that, rather 
than "Jesus is Lord" (1 Corinthians 12:3), the proof-texts around 
which the essays would center would be "God so loved the world that 
he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should 
not perish, but have everlasting life." (John 3:16). I would have 
thought, that is, that a distinctively Christian perspective would derive 
from the combination of a belief in a fallen world, which some authors 
mention but which is shared by Jews among others, coupled with a 
belief in the possibility of redemption, which is also shared by Jews 
among others, as confirmed by Jesus's death and resurrection, which is 
what distinguishes Christianity from other religions that otherwise 
agree on fallen-ness and the possibility of redemption.10 Yet, while 
fallen-ness and the possibility of redemption crop up in several essays, 
few seem to make Jesus's death and resurrection central to their 
authors' perspectives on legal thought. I conclude this Review with a 
brief speculation about why that might have occurred after discussing 
the three categories of essays I have described. 
II. RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH SECULAR 
PERSPECTIVES 
The United States is a religiously pluralist culture dominated by 
Christianity. Given pluralism, it is understandable that some authors 
- and to some extent the editors - assimilate Christian perspectives 
narrative theology in modern Protestantism. Stanley Hauerwas is mentioned occasionally, 
but his theological method is not, except in Shaffer's essay. P. 329. 
9. David M. Smolin suggests a distinctively Christian approach to the question, though, 
in his observation that Christians are instructed to turn the other cheek and not to return evil 
for evil. P. 371. 
10. Bill Stuntz pointed out to me that the essays also do not discuss in detail Jesus's posi­
tion, historically important in the emergence of Christianity from Judaism and more gener­
ally important in the development of Christian perspectives on law, which was that the Mo­
saic law failed in producing good behavior because mere compliance with the law alone 
could not produce good people. E-mail from Bill Stuntz, Professor, Harvard Law School, to 
Mark Tushnet (Feb. 4, 2003) (on file with author). Obviously, a critique of the Mosaic law 
need not generalize into a critique of law as such, yet Jesus's critique of the Mosaic law was 
often generalized in that manner. 
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to religious ones more generally.11 So, for example, the editors assert 
that "Christianity, along with other faiths, may be an antidote to th[ e] 
great moral failing of our time," the domination of modern life by 
"selfish, shallow, materialistic, cruel, and nihilistic values."12 And, in­
deed, some of the Christian perspectives presented here are compati­
ble with wholly secular ones. 
For example, Marci A. Hamilton attributes the Framers' design of 
the Constitution, and particularly their reliance on structural rather 
than substantive guarantees for liberty, to a Calvinist and Presbyterian 
tradition that coupled distrust of fallen human beings with optimism 
about the ability of structures to deter tyranny (p. 293). This "funda­
mental distrust of human motives, beliefs, and actions . . . counsels in 
favor of diligent surveillance of one's own and other's [sic] actions," 
and in favor as well of the "value of the law . . . to guide human 
behavior away from its propensity to do wrong" (p. 295). Hamilton 
connects this view to the educational backgrounds of important Fram­
ers such as James Madison and James Wilson (p. 294), and then ex­
plores the ways in which the view played itself out in the Constitu­
tional Convention (pp. 296-304). 
All this is fair enough, and historically illuminating. But, aside 
from the biographical points about the Framers, nothing in the per­
spective - a form of skepticism joined with a form of optimism - is 
distinctively Christian. Even secularists could hold similar views. A 
prime candidate for a secular view combining skepticism on the level 
of individuals with optimism on the social level is the view that sees 
people motivated by rational self-interest as understood by econo­
mists. Stephen M. Bainbridge's essay suggests the point. Bainbridge 
asks whether law-and-economics is a perspective a Christian can 
hold.13 Bainbridge seeks to allay concern that the assumptions about 
human behavior animating law-and-economics are inconsistent with 
Christian views. Bainbridge brings Christian and secular perspectives 
into alignment by arguing that a Christian can believe that economic 
policy should be motivated solely by the goal of wealth maximization 
even though Christianity incorporates "other normative values" be­
cause those values are better expressed elsewhere and badly expressed 
in economic policy (pp. 212-13). He further argues that Christians can 
use rational-choice assumptions to analyze public policy even though 
rational-choice models seem to preclude appeal to "the Christian vir-
11. See, e.g., p. 469 (essay on legal ethics by Joseph G. Allegretti) (asking, "What does 
God require of me, or you, or any Christian? Simply this: to do justice, love mercy, and walk 
humbly with our God." (citing Micah 6:8)). 
12. P. xix ("To ignore Christian (and other religious) perspectives on law is like ignoring 
a life raft on an endangered vessel."). 
13. Bainbridge explicitly refers to "the Calvinist principle of sphere sovereignty" in de­
fending the limited state. Pp. 214-15. 
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tues" and seem to be inconsistent with the communitarian elements in 
Christian thought because such models do not hold themselves out as 
providing moral norms.14 
Catherine M.A. Mc Cauliff's essay on contract law is perhaps even 
more dramatic in its insistence that general - and, to my mind, secu­
lar - principles are equally Christian principles. The essay focuses on 
Lord Mansfield and Lord Denning, who, according to Mc Cauliff, 
"applied timeless Christian values to particular legal problems," and, 
in Denning's case, "used explicitly Christian language" (p. 471). She 
describes two of Denning's opinions dealing with the law of construc­
tive trusts. These opinions, she argues, were motivated by Denning's 
Christian beliefs and "reflect[] a Christian interpretation of natural 
law and the equity of the law."15 She continues, "The fair person out­
side the natural-law tradition - indeed, outside the Christian tradition 
entirely - frequently reaches the same result as the Christian . . .  but 
would not go beyond fairness to faith in explaining the morality of the 
decisions" (p. 481 ). 
As Mc Cauliff points out, there is one Christian tradition according 
to which secular and religious perspectives on moral problems should 
converge. This is the natural-law tradition, which, as Angela C. 
Carmella puts it, "enabled the [Roman Catholic] church to converse 
with people of all faiths and of no faith, because the reasoned 
discourse offered by natural law was considered universal to all per­
sons. "16 Using Augustine as a model, H. Jefferson Powell develops a 
criticism of modern liberal polities that leads him to conclude: 
[T]he Christian's loyalty to society and state is strictly limited and critical: 
all claims that cultural achievements or earthly politics are the modality 
of ultimate human fulfillment are excluded, and secular institutions must 
limit themselves to the penultimate resolution of issues involving "the 
things relevant to mortal life." But within those limits, and with respect 
to those goals, Christians share their pagan fellow citizens' obligation to 
seek the common good . ... (p. 82; emphasis added) 
The first part of this formulation invokes a religious - though not, I 
think, a distinctively Christian - view, while the second part aligns the 
believer with the nonbeliever. Of course, John Rawls provided a 
14. P. 217; see, e.g., p. 222 (asserting that the assumptions about human behavior made 
by law-and-economics "are largely congruent with the fallen state of man"). 
15. P. 481. Contrary to Mc Caulifrs claim, though, I do not find in the opinions any ex­
plicitly Christian language, unless she means that the explicit invocation of fairness is explic­
itly Christian. The signal "see" doesn't quite do the job, but in any event, see Eves v. Eves, 1 
W.L.R. 1338 (C.A. 1975), and Tanner v. Tanner, 1 W.L.R. 1346 (C.A. 1975). For a similar 
suggestion that Christianity is distinctively concerned with justice, see p. xi (preface by Har­
old J. Berman) (giving an example that moves from a discussion of Christianity to a discus­
sion of justice without indicating that the author believes that a transition has occurred). 
16. P. 273. Gerard V. Bradley provides an expository essay on the natural-law tradition 
with particular emphasis on modern natural-law theory. Pp. 277-90. 
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secular version of the view that all people exercising their capacity to 
reason will converge on a set of principles to guide public policy.17 
Non-Christians and secularists may be comforted by learning that 
this sort of convergence is possible, because it allows for alliances and 
"peace treaties" in the conduct of public life.1 8 And, I believe, the 
editors are right in suggesting that the culture of modern America 
makes it important to educate (some) non-Christians and secularists in 
this way. They note that "[i]n recent years the most vocal proponents 
of Christian perspectives on law and politics have come from the 
religious right," leading "many in the American academy" to fear 
"that a Christian view of law will yield an authoritarian conservative 
regime" (p. xxi). The editors "offer two responses," one of which is 
that "this is an inaccurate caricature," referring to the range of posi­
tions - from conservative to progressive (on slavery's abolition, on 
the death penalty, on social justice, for example) - taken by evangeli­
cal Christians and the Roman Catholic church throughout U.S. his­
tory.19 Yet, the very point of demonstrating the possibility of conver­
gence is to show that there is nothing distinctively Christian about the 
matters as to which convergence occurs.20 
Ill. CHRISTIANITY GENERATING PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 
Another set of essays is related to the first. In the second group the 
author says, in effect: "I am a Christian, and here is my perspective on 
17. Michael McConnell refers to this aspect of Rawls's work with an unexplained am­
bivalence. See pp. 17-18 ("To borrow a distinction from John Rawls without necessarily em­
bracing his conception of it, early liberalism was a 'political' liberalism."). 
18. Which was one of Rawls's basic points. 
19. P. xxi. Their second response is "that it is unprincipled and undemocratic to exclude 
or marginalize fellow citizens on the mere expectation that they will vote the wrong way." Id. 
(emphasis added). This raises larger questions than the single sentence devoted to it by the 
editors can address, although some are touched on as well in Michael McConnell's essay, pp. 
5-24, which succinctly restates his position on the relation between Christianity and liberal­
ism, taking the latter as both a concept in political theory and a practice embedded in his­
torical time. 
20. Raymond Plant suggests that the difficulty I identify in this section may be a version 
of a more general difficulty in developing what he calls a political theology: 
If the universal is stressed, then we are likely to end up with a form of political theology 
which is, as it were, deduced from some basic doctrine of God, creation and the human per­
son which, in turn, is held to underpin rather generalised assertions about the nature of po­
litical values such as freedom, social justice, the common good and rights. These might be 
too vague and indeterminate to link into anything like the ways of life of particular societies, 
and will not provide rich enough moral ground for Christian political commitments. On the 
other hand, if the emphasis is placed upon particular communities and their ways of life, it 
will not be at all clear how these more fragmentary judgements about particular societies will 
relate to more general beliefs about the nature of God and, in particular, the coherence of 
God's will in terms of values and the implications of.such beliefs for a more general theistic 
account of the nature of human politics, economics and community life. 
PLANT, supra note 3, at 19. 
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law, which - as I experience it - arises from my Christian belief." 
Often the perspective is, once again, not distinctively Christian. 
John Witte, Jr., and John Copeland Nagle provide two good 
examples. Early in his essay on the history of marriage law and its 
relation to Christianity, Witte observes that "convictions" drawn from 
religion "inform my work on the interaction of law and religion in 
Western history" (p. 409). These convictions, he writes, include "the 
assumption that God is both hidden and revealed in human laws and 
that human laws in turn both reflect and deflect divine values" (p. 
409). On reading Witte's account of the interaction between marriage 
law and theological norms, I wondered whether a historian with dif­
ferent religious beliefs, or with none at all, would treat the material 
differently. It seems to me that Christianity figures in Witte's work as 
a motivation for his identification of topics, and perhaps as a source of 
insight into the material that would be more difficult for a non­
Christian to gain.21 
Nagle asserts that he seeks a "distinctively Christian message about 
environmental law" (p. 438). He lists his assumptions, such as these: 
God created the world, God's creation is good, God is the owner of all 
creation, God gave humans dominion over creation (pp. 438-42). He 
continues that his essay is an "attempt . . .  to explain how one Chris­
tian - namely, me - tries to take the Christian teaching on creation 
and a Christian understanding of law and apply them to several cur­
rent problems in environmental law" (p. 442). Nagle then identifies 
problems such as conflicts between people and creatures, such as 
mountain lions encroaching on suburbs (or suburbs encroaching on 
mountain lions), and the threat to endangered species. Nagle refers to 
the diversity of God's creation and the story of Noah's Ark as provid­
ing the basis for a "Christian duty to preserve endangered species."22 
He concludes that the best policy approach to the conflicts he identi­
fies is a balancing approach, which is of course not distinctively 
Christian but which, Nagle says, "fits well with Christian teachings" (p. 
451). 
Of course I accept these authors' assertions of the connections be­
tween their Christian beliefs and their perspectives on the topics they 
write about, but I find in the essays little to suggest the nature of those 
connections. Timothy L. Hall's essay on the Baptist tradition comes 
much closer to showing how such connections arise, and discussing it 
can serve as a transition to my consideration of a third set of essays. 
21. Witte's Christianity, that is, seems to me to serve as a guide to what philosophers of 
science call hypothesis selection or generation rather than as a guide to the identification of 
truth. 
22. P. 444. I would note that the reference to Noah's Ark suggests that the duty to pre­
serve species is not distinctively Christian. (I believe that there are parallel stories in other 
religious traditions as well.) 
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Most of Hall's essay is an exposition of the traditional Baptist posi­
tion of strict separation, but Hall concludes with a few pages criticizing 
the interest of some modern Baptists in "us[ing] the law to impose 
moral and social norms consistent with their understanding of 
Christian teachings" (p. 349). Hall sympathetically locates the reason 
for this interest in the moral pluralism that "has challenged . . .  confi­
dence that democratic systems can find common cause around a set of 
fundamental moral principles," but finds the interest inconsistent with 
deeper Baptist traditions and "harmful to the cause of Christ."2 3 The 
newer practice is harmful to that cause because it limits the ability 
of Baptists to make common cause with other Christians and with 
non-Christians, but perhaps more because "[t]he gospel of peace be­
comes associated with the sword," and there's one with an ensuing 
"stunted vision of Christian principles" such as nonretribution and 
sacrificial love (pp. 351-52). As Hall writes, 
The surge of enthusiasm for "Christian" values ... entices followers of 
Christ to label as Christian values that are scarcely more than law­
abidingness. There is nothing uniquely Christian, for example, in re­
fraining from harming others - especially the innocent - or in being 
faithful to one's commitments, including one's marriage commit­
ments .... The call of Christ is to something more than good citizenship, 
something more than stolid Republican conservativism. But the constant 
trumpeting of calls for "Christian values" seems to suggest otherwise. (p. 
352) 
Hall concludes, "The law does not need to be tethered to Christ, and 
the cause of Christ neither needs to be nor profits from being tethered 
to the law" (p. 352). 
Hall's approach emerges organically from his Christian commit­
ments and its insistence on identifying something that makes a per­
spective distinctively Christian. Perhaps Hall can do this because of the 
content of his position.24 He argues that Baptist pietism can make 
"[v]ery little" contribution to law, because that "theological perspec­
tive denies to law the mantle of either inherent divinity or diabolical­
ness" (p. 352). The other essays in this collection rarely if ever claim 
that law is inherently divine or diabolical. Yet, the more restrained the 
claims are, the more, that is, they recognize that the work of fallen 
human beings partakes of both divinity and fallen-ness, the less dis­
tinctively Christian the claims are. 
23. P. 350. Hall's invocation of what I call deeper traditions is of course something that 
someone operating within a tradition can do. But, outsiders note, as do the editors, the varia­
tion over time in the content of something that is nonetheless identifiably a single tradition. 
24. Although in quoting these passages from Hall, I acknowledge that I am - and am 
intending to - endorse the separatist tradition Hall associates with traditional Baptism. 
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IV. CHRISTIAN BELIEF 0RGANICALL Y CONNECTED TO A 
PERSPECTIVE ON LAW 
Stephen L. Carter and Teresa Stanton Collett both offer critiques 
of liberalism. Carter's summarizes the views he has presented in more 
detail elsewhere. 25 Carter's critique of liberalism is more from a gen­
erically religious point of view than from a distinctively Christian one. 
Collett's is different. The content is not all that different from Carter's, 
but the presentation - the pervasive Christianity - is. She begins 
with one of the book's few mentions of what I would have thought 
truly distinctive about Christian beliefs. Acknowledging diversity 
among Christians, Collett nonetheless points to the unity among 
Christians on the beliefs "that God created the universe in accordance 
with a divine plan, that people are estranged from God, and that 
God's plan included the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ as 
the means of reconciling Creator and created" (p. 178). Collett's cri­
tique of liberalism takes the form of an exegesis of biblical texts from 
the Christian gospels as mediated through recent papal encyclicals. 
Angela C. Carmella's presentation of the Catholic Church's social 
teachings is equally distinctively Christian even though the content of 
the social teachings itself is not. Like Collette, Carmella invokes Je­
sus's death and resurrection as central to her perspective on law: "Be­
cause the Word has become flesh, things of the earth can carry the 
mystery and power of God" (p. 257). From this, she argues, the 
Catholic Church has a "clear theological sense of immersion in the 
world and of movement toward its transformation through the promo­
tion of human dignity" (p. 258). She emphasizes as well the recent ex­
pansion of the Church's discourse beyond the natural-law tradition to 
include thick doses of biblical language: "Both the Bible and the 
church's sacramental sense call on Christians to see Jesus in the de­
spised, the poor, the weak, and the 'useless' " (p. 275). 
Richard F. Duncan's essay demonstrates the same kind of organic 
connection between the author's Christianity and his perspective on 
law, albeit the content of the perspective is quite different. Duncan's 
central contention is that "Christians wander today in an America that 
has rejected our God - indeed, in an America that often seems to be 
waging war against our God" (p. 355). But, in ways resembling tradi­
tional pietists, Duncan recognizes that the law of Babylon "will typi­
cally reflect the morality and values of Babylon, not those of Jerusa­
lem" (pp. 355-56). Duncan therefore suggests that Christians can do 
little more than adopt pragmatic responses to the law's threats, the 
25. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN 
LAW ANO POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); STEPHEN L. CARTER, 
Goo's NAME IN v AIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000). 
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most important of which is "to reduce significantly the size of the 
state."2 6 
In the pursuit of that pragmatic agenda, Duncan points to the 
housing-discrimination claim against Evelyn Smith, who refused to 
rent one of the four apartments she owned (in a building which she did 
not herself occupy) to an unmarried couple, citing her religious belief 
that sex outside of marriage is sinful and that renting the apartment to 
people who were likely to engage in such sex would implicate her in 
their sin and thus be sinful itself. The California Supreme Court held 
that her action violated the state's fair-housing laws, and that the 
Constitution did not require that the state give her a religiously based 
exemption from those laws. 27 The court argued that Smith's religious 
belief was not substantially burdened because she operated the apart­
ments as a purely commercial activity, and could invest her money in 
an alternative that would not put her to a choice between complying 
with the law and complying with her religious conscience. Duncan 
construes this as a holding that "when people of faith choose to 
engage in commercial activities in California they waive their right to 
religious freedom . . . .  The world has indeed turned upside down, and 
good has become evil and evil good" (pp. 367-68). 
Marie A. Failinger and Patrick R. Keifert suggest a somewhat dif­
ferent view of Smith's dilemma (and, perhaps, Duncan's as well). They 
provide a Lutheran perspective on the civil law, in which "law is the 
demand of God for preservation and re-creation of the world, 
expressed through such orders of creation as the family and the state" 
(p. 389). But, Failinger and Keifert write, 
No one can avoid the sins of the will: it is as likely (perhaps more likely) 
that one individual claiming in conscience to be exempt from positive law 
is driven by the sins of self-interest and self-delusion as it is that the ma­
jority's decision is so flawed; it is as likely that an oppressed minority will 
use power corruptly as will a self-satisfied majority. (p. 392) 
26. P. 356. Although Duncan does not spell the point out, I take the thought here to be 
that Christians can use the resources of Babylonian law in their effort to reduce the state's 
size (because of his acknowledgement that the law of Babylon will reflect Babylonian val­
ues). 
27. P. 367. The case is Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909 
(Cal. 1996). The court assumed that Smith might be taken to have presented a "hybrid" 
claim under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), but did not directly so hold. 
Instead, it said that the test applied to hybrid claims was the one embodied in the then-still 
applicable Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court then found that application of the 
antidiscrimination law did not place a substantial burden on Smith's religious exercise be­
cause of the availability of alternative investment opportunities. Today, after City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the court's analysis would be cast directly as an analysis of a 
hybrid claim (or the court might reject the claim on the ground that it was not really a hybrid 
one). Litigation on a related question in the Ninth Circuit ended inconclusively. See Thomas 
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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The Christian's dilemma, that is, is not simply that the Christian 
may perceive a conflict between the state's demands and the demands 
of conscience; it is equally that the Christian must wonder whether the 
conflict she perceives is a result of the world's fallen-ness or her own. 28 
This last dilemma suggests in turn why so few of the essays in this 
book seem (to me, at least) to present a perspective on legal thought 
that is at once distinctively Christian and organically connected to the 
author's Christianity. The editors and some contributors hint at, or re­
fer to, the marginalization of Christians in the contemporary United 
States. Writing this Review in late December, and as a non-Christian, 
I find this view puzzling when stated without qualification. The neces­
sary qualification, I think, is that contemporary U. S. culture may per­
haps marginalize Christians whose perspectives - on legal thought, 
on culture, on literature, and so on down the list of possibilities - are 
distinctively Christian rather than generically religious or, even more, 
merely compatible with secular perspectives, and whose perspectives 
derive organically from their holder's Christianity. In today's United 
States, that is, there may not be enough potential authors with what I 
would identify as truly Christian perspectives on legal thought to fill 
out a collection of essays published with that title. 29 
28. Oliver Cromwell's exhortation to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 
"l beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken," available at 
http://www.digiserve.co.uk/quotations/search.cgi?type=Author&terms=Oliver%20Cromwell 
(website indexing Cromwell quotes) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003), seems relevant here. 
29. I write this final sentence fully acknowledging that I am in no position to adjudicate 
what is a "truly" Christian perspective. I certainly do not mean to suggest that the essays' 
authors are not "true" Christians in any sense. My point is that I read the essays hoping to 
find perspectives that derived in some strongly presented way from the authors' under­
standing of Jesus's distinctive position in religious thought, and found relatively few of them. 
That is why I have included the modifying phrase "what I would identify as" in the sentence 
in the text. 
